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Metaphoric amalgams consist in the integration of two or more metaphors 
resulting in a unified conceptual package. They have been distinguished from the 
sequencing or chaining of metaphors without incorporation of the structure of one 
into another (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza & Galera 2012). Such amalgams have been 
categorised into single-source and double-source (Ruiz de Mendoza & Galera 
2011). In the former, one of the metaphors becomes part of the source-target 
structure of another metaphor; in the latter, two metaphors map their source 
domains onto the same target domain. On the basis of a multisource corpus, the 
present Master’s dissertation revises previous work on these categories, thus 
solving some analytical problems. This has also resulted in the addition of new 
analytical categories. This is the case of what I propose to term binary metaphoric 
amalgams. For example, the sentence The sign warned us against skating on the 
pond combines two metaphors by integrating them into a force-dynamic 
schematic configuration: A PERSON’S WILL IS A FORCE and REGULATIONS 
ARE COUNTERFORCES, which are based on the AGONIST/ANTAGONIST 
force schema (Talmy 1988). Here, the integration is based on co-dependency: 
two metaphors complement each other and act at the same level within an image-
schematic complex (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza fc).  













Una amalgama metafórica consiste en la integración de dos o más metáforas, 
cuyo resultado es un paquete conceptual unificado. Han sido distinguidas de la 
secuenciación o cadena metafórica, en la que no hay incorporación de estructura 
de una dentro de otra (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza & Galera 2012). Dichas amalgamas 
han sido previamente categorizadas en amalgamas single-source y double-
source (Ruiz de Mendoza & Galera 2011). En las primeras, una de las metáforas 
pasa a formar parte de la estructura source-target de otra metáfora, mientras que 
en las segundas, dos metáforas proyectan su dominio source en el mismo 
dominio target. Tomando como base un corpus de múltiples fuentes, este trabajo 
de Máster revisa investigaciones previas de estas categorías, solucionando 
alguno de sus problemas analíticos, lo que ha acabado resultando en la adición 
de nuevas categorías analíticas. Este es el caso de la que propongo como 
amalgamas metafóricas binarias, como es el ejemplo The sign warned us against 
skating on the pond, que combina dos metáforas integrándolos en un Sistema 
de dinámica de fuerzas: A PERSON’S WILL IS A FORCE y REGULATIONS ARE 
COUNTERFORCES, que se basan en el sistema de fuerzas de 
AGONISTA/ANTAGONISTA (Talmy 1988). En este caso. La integración se basa 
en la codependencia: dos metáforas se complementan una a otra y actúan al 
mismo nivel dentro de un mismo esquema de imagen. (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza fc).  
Palabras clave: metáfora del yo dividido, dinámica de fuerzas, metáfora, 












As is well known, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argued against the common idea 
that metaphors are just merely poetical devices and gave initial evidence in support 
of their pervasiveness in everyday communication. Since then heavy focus has been 
placed on the analysis and classification of the most conventionalized metaphors in 
English with scarce systematic research into the interaction of two or more 
metaphors within a linguistic expression. Some scholars have devoted some 
attention to the interaction of metaphor and metonymy (e.g. Goossens 1990, 2003, 
Geeraerts 2003) and to the metonymic grounding of metaphor (e.g. Radden 2000). 
There is also work on how metaphors can be chained to one another in coherent 
discourse (e.g. Barcelona 1995) besides very well-known work by the main 
proponents of Conceptual Metaphor Theory on the organization of metaphoric 
thought into systems (e.g. Lakoff 1993, Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; see also 
Kövecses 2010). In recent work, some interest has been shown on what Ruiz de 
Mendoza and his associates have labeled metaphoric amalgams (Ruiz de Mendoza 
& Galera 2011, 2012, 2014 provide initial theoretical explorations, while Pérez-
Hernández & Duvignau 2016, and Pérez-Sobrino 2016, make applications to 
language learning and multimodal communication respectively). These are 
patterned combinations into single conceptual packages of otherwise self-standing 
metaphors and their activity can take place at high levels of conceptualization with 
an impact on grammar (cf. work by Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal 2011 on 
metaphorical constraints on lexical-constructional integration)1.  
My analytical procedure is grounded in the theoretical premises on metaphoric 
amalgams as laid out in Ruiz de Mendoza and Galera (2011, 2012, 2014). However, 
a closer inspection of a greater amount of data than used by these authors, whose 
proposals are programmatic, calls for refinements in their account. Thus, the aim of 
the present Master’s dissertation is to provide a finer-grained study of metaphoric 
																																								 																				
1 In this article, I will use the term “metaphoric” to refer to processes (e.g. metaphoric complex, metaphoric 
amalgam), and “metaphorical” to refer to results (e.g. metaphorical expression).  
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amalgams. This will be partly accomplished by complementing the approach 
mentioned above with insights from Lakoff’s theory of the Multiple Selves (1996), 
which has shown its productivity to deal with our data. Drawing from online sources, 
printed works, and audio-visual media, I have classified, motivated, and analyzed a 
collection of metaphoric amalgams in the categories presented by Ruiz de Mendoza 
and Galera. These are single-source amalgams, in which the source and target 
domains of a metaphor are built into corresponding domains of another metaphor, 
and double-source amalgams, in which two different metaphorical sources map onto 
the same target. My data yield more complex analyses in some cases than the ones 
provided by the authors mentioned above. Also, as part of the results of my research, 
one more category has been identified: binary metaphoric amalgams, in which two 
different metaphors work together complementing each other. I will provide some 
representative examples of each category and analyze them in detail. 
With this in mind, the structure of this Master’s thesis is as follows. Section 2 
details the methodology followed and the selection of corpus. Section 3 focuses on 
the description of the state-of-the-art regarding metaphoric complexes, and offers an 
introductory overview of the theoretical apparatus used in the elaboration of this 
paper. Section 4 organizes, outlines, and analyzes a selection of examples that 
highlight the way in which metaphors interact with one another and with metonymies 
in each of the resulting categories. Finally, the last section provides the reader with 












2. CORPUS AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The approach taken in this paper follows the theoretical postulates of Cognitive 
Linguistics, which denies the autonomous cognitive faculty of language, which is 
argued to emerge from language use (cf. Evans 2014). The concept of what 
constitutes a corpus is still a matter of controversy within an ongoing effort of the 
linguistic community to objectify linguistic analysis as much as possible. For the sake 
of clarity, we are going to adhere to the following definition:  
[…] the notion of “corpus” refers to machine-readable collections of (spoken or 
written) texts that were produced in a natural communicative setting, and the 
collection of texts is compiled with the intention (1) to be representative and 
balanced with respect to a particular linguistic variety or register or genre and 
(2) to be analyzed linguistically (Gries 2009).  
This dissertation is based on an exhaustive analysis of examples obtained from 
the literature on metaphor and metonymy and other studies on linguistics, as well as 
online resources, multimedia sources and personal communication.   
1. The Master Metaphor List (Lakoff et al., 1991). This is a collection of 
metaphors compiled by George Lakoff, Jane Espenson and Adele Goldberg, 
and later updated by Lakoff, Espenson and Alan Schwartz. It also offers a 
classification of the metaphors included in it. However, many of the analyses 
require updating in compliance with the state of the art in metaphor and 
metonymy theory. It is nonetheless a very useful resource because of its 
exhaustiveness as a compilation.  
2. Another useful resource has been the book English Verb Classes and 
Alternations (Levin 1993). This work comes from the field of formal linguistics, 
but it offers a wide variety of constructions many of which can be postulated 
to have a metaphoric or metonymic grounding. For this reason, it has been of 
great interest for the elaboration of the present dissertation.  
3. Some examples were also taken from literary works (Not the Same Sky, Elle). 
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4. The online database COGMOD (http://cogmod.lexicom.es/admin.php), which 
offers an increasing collection of fully analysed examples of metaphors and 
metonymies paired with their equivalences across languages.  
5. Google Books, the search engine specialized in publications by Google.  
6. In an attempt to broaden the approach and offer a more actual vision of the 
English language in use, some examples were taken from audiovisual 
products such as TV series (Marvel’s Daredevil, House of Cards, Game of 
Thrones, Better Call Saul) and films (Hot Fuzz, Drive, Marvel’s Guardians of 
the Galaxy). All of them are contemporary products with an antiquity of less 
than ten years as of the time of this writing in order to provide a present-day 
use of the English language.  
As to the nature of the analysis, the methodological decision made in the 
development of this dissertation is to follow a combined deductive and inductive 
approach. On the one hand, the deductive approach involves starting from a 
theoretical hypothesis and, with the use of data, confirming, rejecting or re-
formulating that hypothesis. On the other hand, the inductive approach has been 
used to draw generalizations resulting in postulates on high-level metaphor and 
metonymy, and on the real scope of application of the Divided Self metaphor in 
English, which, in our view, is broader than originally postulated by Lakoff (1996).  
The approach provided by this paper, despite the large number of examples 
collected and analysed, is qualitative. Our main concern has been to produce and 










3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: COMBINING COGNITIVE MODELS 
 
As mentioned above, the theoretical framework for this article is based upon 
previous work by Ruiz de Mendoza and Galera (2014) on cognitive modeling and 
conceptual combination, which builds on the preliminary insights in Ruiz de Mendoza 
and Mairal (2007, 2008), Mairal and Ruiz de Mendoza (2009), Ruiz de Mendoza and 
Galera (2011, 2012).  
The notion of cognitive model is very popular in Cognitive Linguistics. It was 
originally put forward by Lakoff (1987: 68), under the label of Idealized Cognitive 
Model or ICM. Essentially, an ICM is an internally consistent knowledge structure 
that captures part of our experience with the world as construed by our minds. Lakoff 
distinguished several such structures with implications for linguistic theory. These 
are the following:  
 
(i) Frames, which capture knowledge about objects and events (e.g. eating at 
a restaurant). 
(ii) Image-schemas are abstract spatial characterizations such as topological 
orientations (e.g. up/down, front/back), containment (e.g. in/out), whole-part 
relationships, and motion. 
(iii) Metaphor is understood as the result of conceptual mappings or sets of 
correspondences across discrete conceptual domains such as MORE IS UP, 
which deals with quantity in terms of height (e.g. Prices are rising again). 
(iv) Metonymy is defined as a conceptual mapping where one structure 
affords access to a related structure within the same conceptual domain, as 
in He drank two bottles (CONTAINER FOR CONTENT).  
 
One of the developments of the notion of cognitive modeling has gone in the 
direction of investigating conceptual interaction patterns involving metaphor and 
metonymy. Preliminary work is found in Goossens (1990) and Ruiz de Mendoza and 
Díez (2002). Extensive work applied to all levels of linguistic description is found in 
Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez (2011) and Ruiz de Mendoza and Galera (2014). For 
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the purposes of our study, I will draw especially from Ruiz de Mendoza and Galera’s 
account of conceptual complexes, which are addressed in section 3.1. Then, section 
3.2 briefly discusses the theory of Multiple Selves (Lakoff, 1996).  
 
3.1. Conceptual complexes 
 
It is not the purpose of this article to discuss all modes of interaction involving 
metaphor and metonymy. Our focus is on one kind of interaction, i.e. metaphoric 
amalgams. However, it may benefit the reader to have an outline of the main 
interaction types. This will allow the reader to situate metaphoric amalgams within 
the broader context of the different metaphor-metonymy interaction types.  
 
3.1.1. Metaphoric complexes 
 
In Ruiz de Mendoza and Galera (2014), conceptual complexes, which are 
combinations of metonymies and/or metaphors, are usually classified into three 
different groups. One consists in the various cases of interaction between metaphor 
and metonymy, which is developed by these authors on the basis of preliminary work 
by Goossens (1990) on so-called metaphtonymy (see also Ruiz de Mendoza 2014). 
For example, the metaphoric source in beat one’s breast, which includes reference 
to sorrow and guilt, is the result of expanding the partial scenario of breast-beating 
into a situation where this action stands for an open show of sorrow, which then 
maps onto any other situation where a similar open show is made without any breast 
beating. A second group includes several cases of metonymy-metonymy integration. 
For example, He has swift fingers (i.e. He can use his fingers swiftly, typically to 
steal) involves metonymic domain expansion (INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION) plus 
domain reduction (ACTION FOR ABILITY TO PERFORM THE ACTION) (cf. Ruiz 
de Mendoza 2000, for a more detailed analysis of interaction types). The third group 
is based on the integration of metaphors, which Ruiz de Mendoza and Galera (2014: 
96) label metaphoric complexes, that is, those that involve any kind of combination 
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between two or more metaphors. These, in turn, can be split into two categories, i.e. 
metaphoric chains and metaphoric amalgams.  
In metaphoric chains, the target domain of one metaphor becomes the source 
domain of another subsequent metaphor. A case in point is supplied by the 
expression give someone away, where give away, when applied to people, loses its 
original meaning of ‘bestowal’ (in itself the target of a metonymy from the domain of 
voluntary physical separation) while acquiring the sense of revealing someone’s 
secrets. Two metaphors can be postulated. The first metaphor maps ‘dispensing 
with an object’ (source) onto ‘dispensing with a person’ (target), which in turn 
becomes the source of a new metaphor which maps onto the idea of betraying a 
person (i.e. DISPENSING WITH AN OBJECT IS DISPENSING WITH A PERSON + 
DISPENSING WITH A PERSON IS BETRAYING A PERSON). This second 
mapping is grounded in the fact that betrayed people feel alienated from those they 
trusted.  
The notion of metaphoric amalgams was first introduced by Ruiz de Mendoza 
(2008) and it was later brought into the broader picture of metaphorical complexes 
by Ruiz de Mendoza and Galera (2011), Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal (2011), and 
Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez (2011). This interaction type involves the integration of 
the conceptual material of two or more metaphors. Two kinds of metaphoric 
amalgams have been identified so far: single-source metaphoric amalgams and 
double source metaphoric amalgams. Metaphoric amalgams, which have only been 
explored programmatically in the literature mentioned above, will be treated in 
greater detail in section 4, where several use patterns will be put forward. Here, I will 
make reference to two of the examples put forward in Ruiz de Mendoza and Galera 
(2011): He traced my symptoms back to the cause of my disease and He beat 
silence into me.  
The first example is a case of single-source metaphoric amalgam. For expository 
convenience, in this article it will be contrasted with A fast-moving bacterial infection 
killed the boy. This latter sentence treats a disease as if it were a moving object that 
can invade and kill a person. However, this metaphor, which can be labeled EVENTS 
ARE MOVING OBJECTS, is not enough to account for the inferences arising from 
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the former, where the focus of attention is on finding the cause of the disease. This 
shift of focus recruits conceptual structure from CAUSES ARE SOURCES (OF 
MOTION), or more specifically, from THE CAUSE OF AN EVENT IS THE SOURCE 
OF MOTION (e.g. Can you find the source of this problem?). This is possible 
because of the existence of shared structure between these two metaphors. In the 
combination, CAUSES ARE SOURCES becomes part of EVENTS ARE MOVING 
OBJECTS. As a result of this combination, we treat the symptoms of a disease as 
traces left by a moving object that can be followed up to the starting point of motion. 
The treatment of causes as sources should not be surprising since it is part of our 
experience where it is often the case that we see the onset of motion in connection 
to whatever causes it (e.g. think of a bullet being fired). This is clearly a case of what 
the cognitive-linguistic literature has labeled a correlation metaphor (cf. Grady 1999; 
Lakoff and Johnson 1999). 
In He beat silence into me, someone (the receiver) acquires the property of 
silence not only as an object but also as the destination of motion. That is, silence is 
treated as an object that is transferred from the causer of motion (he) to the 
destination of motion (me) by means of beating.2 The destination of motion is further 
seen as a bounded region in space, which is suggestive of the idea that an object 
that enters a person’s field of control can become a possession (which, in turn, can 
have some effect on the person). As a result, we have the interaction of the 
metaphors CHANGE IS A TRANSFER OF POSSESSION and CHANGE IS 
(CAUSED) MOTION. The target domain of both metaphors is the same (CHANGE, 
motivated by psychological impact), and both their source domains map onto it, 
originating a double-source metaphoric amalgam. There are other metaphorical 
expressions that follow this pattern: He put fear into my heart, He breathed love into 
my soul, He slapped some common sense into her. In all of them being forced to 
acquire a new property is treated as both receiving and taking possession of a 
moving object.   
																																								 																				
2 It goes without saying that the beating may be either literal or figurative. If it is figurative, another lower-level 
metaphor can be added to the description affecting the manner of motion component of the more abstract motion 
schema; for the difference between high and low-level mappings, see Ruiz de Mendoza and Galera (2014: 63-
65). 
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3.1.2. Compound metaphors 
 
Metaphoric amalgams are not the same as compound metaphors. This latter 
theoretical construct, which was put forward by Grady (1997, 2005), is used to refer 
to combinations of primary metaphors rooted in sensorimotor experience. There are 
two main differences between each conceptual construct. First, in compounds, but 
not in amalgams, linguistic expressions profile one of the contributing metaphors, 
while the other is backgrounded. For example, the sentences One piece of the theory 
doesn’t fit and His theory stands on firm foundations are cases of the compound 
metaphor THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS. This metaphor is argued by Grady to 
consist in the combination of two primary metaphors: ORGANIZATION IS 
PHYSICAL STRUCTURE and PERSISTING IS REMAINING ERECT. Evidently, the 
first sentence focuses on lack of organization, while the second zooms in on 
persistence. Neither metaphorical expression exploits the two primary metaphors at 
the same time. That is, in compounds, there is no actual integration or fusion 
between the source and target domains of the contributing metaphors, although the 
two primary metaphors may be combined in some expressions: They have built a 
solid theory (since buildings are erect structures). It is also possible to find situations 
where one of the primary metaphors implies (but not necessarily entails) the other: 
A single contrary fact can bring down a theory (in which the theory coming ‘down’ 
implies the possible loss of structure). A second difference between metaphoric 
amalgams and compound metaphors is that in the former there is shared structure 
between the contributing metaphors. For example, in He traced my symptoms back 
to the cause of my disease, the two source domains are constructed on the basis of 
motion, with one of them focusing on the existence of a moving object and the other 
on the visible evidences of the existence of motion. This is not the case in compound 
metaphors (e.g. physical organization and persistence have no elements in 
common, although, as noted above, on occasion, one may imply the other: if we 






In his latest discussion of metaphorical amalgams Ruiz de Mendoza (2017: 164-
155) has pointed out that amalgams are not the same phenomenon as Fauconnier 
and Turner’s (2002) single-scope or double-scope blends (see Oakley and Pascual 
2017 for an updated overview).  
In single-scope blends partial structure of one knowledge construct (i.e. one “input 
space”) is built into (and adapted to) the relevant part of the frame of another 
knowledge construct (another “input space”). For example, if we think of someone’s 
teeth as pearls, we ascribe to (and build into) our vision of those teeth the whiteness 
and brightness characteristic of pearls. The same logic would apply to any metaphor 
that does not involve a complex mapping of structure. This would hold both for 
metaphors based on resemblance, like the teeth-pearls example, and those based 
on experiential correlations as is the case of MORE IS UP (Grady 1999; Lakoff and 
Johnson 1999). For example, in the expression They raised his salary, the verb 
“raise” suggests an increase in height that somehow correlates with an increase in 
the amount of income. In standard Conceptual Metaphor Theory, it is argued that 
quantity and height correlate in our experience because an accumulation of 
materials generally brings about an increase in their height (think of a pile of books 
or of water levels in a container). In terms of blending, height would be regarded as 
an input space, which is built into quantity in such a way that both become blended 
in our minds.  
In double-scope blends, by contrast, the integration of conceptual structure 
requires the combination or “blend” to produce its own emergent structure –including 
a reversal of roles and values and source-target asymmetries– independent of (but 
relatable to) the one that is supplied by the source and target domains. Take as an 
example the sentence If Clinton were the Titanic, the iceberg would sink (Fauconnier 
2005). This sentence was a humorous remark, in 1998, on Clinton’s ability to survive 
all his sexual scandals without much political damage. In Fauconnier’s (2005) 
account, Clinton is the counterpart of the Titanic and the scandal is the counterpart 
of the iceberg. The blend incorporates much of its organizing frame structure from 
	 11	
the Titanic input space (where a voyage is thwarted by disaster that destroys the 
ship and most of its passengers) but the crucial causal and event structure is taken 
from the Clinton scenario: unlike the Titanic, Clinton (surprisingly) survives, which 
reverses the causality of sinking (in reality, the iceberg sinks the ship) in defiance of 
the laws of physics.  
Another example of double-scope blending, discussed by Grady, Coulson and 
Oakley (1999), is provided by the sentence My surgeon is a butcher. The authors 
argue that besides the correspondences between the elements of the two input 
spaces called upon by the expression, the domain of surgery and the domain of 
butchery (i.e. surgeon-butcher, patient-commodity, scalpel-cleaver, operating room-
abattoir, etc.), there is emergent structure not present in either input. This emergent 
structure takes the form of the surgeon’s incompetence in performing surgery. While 
surgeons are not expected to operate on their patients in the same way as butchers 
cut up meat, both surgeons and butchers are, in principle, competent in what they 
do. However, in this metaphor, the surgeon is incompetent by performing surgery in 
a careless way. This is an emerging element of structure that arises from the blend, 
where the roles of surgeons and butchers become integrated.  
Blending theory was discussed critically by Ruiz de Mendoza (1998) and Ruiz de 
Mendoza and Díez (2002). These authors argued that the emergent structure 
ascribed to blends is simply a range of pragmatic implications arising from the cross-
domain correspondences. More recently, Kövecses (2011) has pointed out that, 
while conceptual integration may take place occasionally and holds true of some 
examples of metaphor, it does not really hold the universal status that the proponents 
of blending theory give to it. Most examples of conceptual metaphor are best 
explained in terms of cross-domain mappings rather than the integration of 
conceptual structure. This observation applies to the example My surgeon is a 
butcher, where it can be argued that the surgeon’s and butcher’s roles do not really 
mix up. What we have, from a cognitive perspective, is the understanding of a given 
surgeon’s way of practicing surgery in terms of a butcher’s way of cutting meat. The 
element of “carelessness” arises from this comparison, not from a fusion of roles.  
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Independently of the controversy as to the theoretical status of conceptual 
integration processes, the examples of single and double-scope blends given above 
do not involve amalgams since they do not call for combinations of self-standing 
metaphors or of components of such metaphors. They simply involve elements of 
metaphoric source or target domains (the so-called input spaces). This observation 
adds to two more supplied in Ruiz de Mendoza (2017), who notes that amalgams (i) 
take place independently of the calculation of meaning implications in the process of 
blending, and (ii) are based on regular interaction patterns and do not contemplate 
asymmetries or irregularities of any sort. These reasons render blending theory 
irrelevant for the purposes of the present research.   
 
3.2. The DIVIDED SELF metaphor 
 
Part of this article draws on the theory of the Multiple Selves put forward by Lakoff 
(1996). This theory hinges on the existence of a cultural model, grounded in our 
experience, of the bodily and emotional aspects of humans. In this cultural model, 
the person is seen as an ensemble of the Subject and the Self. The Subject is the 
center of consciousness and judgment, while the Self represents the emotional and 
irrational aspects of a person. On the basis of this assumption, Lakoff postulates the 
existence of two groups of metaphoric models: one group contains the 
Consciousness and Control models, and the other the Split Self Compatibility 
models. The Consciousness and Control group is founded on the premise that, in a 
normal state of consciousness, the Subject is in control of the Self. This can also be 
extended into the idea of the “co-location” of both entities being in a normal state of 
control, which implies that the Self can be projected outside of the Subject. For 
example, in Chris hates himself for being so naïve, ‘Chris’ would act as the Subject, 
the judging rational entity that knows that naivety is not a desirable feature in that 
situation, while ‘himself’ would act as the Self, i.e. the aspect of the person that did 
not act according to what would have been optimal or at least preferable. Thus, the 
Subject has lost control over the Self. This idea of co-location can be mapped onto 
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a spatial model in which the horizontal and vertical planes come into action, situating 
both entities at different points of a line. In turn, the Split Self Compatibility models 
consist in different Selves, which may or may not be compatible with one another. 
An example is provided by the sentence I’m split between my scientific self and my 
religious self, where there are two incompatible selves, with the Subject being in the 
middle.  
According to Lakoff, the theory of multiple selves is useful to understand some 
inference patterns that have consequences for grammar. For example, the sentence 
If I were you, I’d hate me differs in meaning from If I were you, I’d hate myself in that 
in the former me refers to the speaker, while in the latter myself refers to the hearer 
in a simulated scenario in which the hearer acts as the speaker would act. In the 
context in which the speaker simulates to be the hearer, the referent of me is 
precisely the speaker himself. This happens because the speaker’s Subject 
combines with the hearer’s Self yielding a hypothetical person that combines the 
speaker’s values and the hearer’s interests, i.e. the grammatical subject in I’d hate 
me is not the speaker but the composite entity that combines the speaker’s Subject 
and the hearer’s Self.  
The examples examined in this research reveal that the Divided Self metaphor is 
not necessarily a metaphorical isolate. It combines with other metaphors and with 
combinations of metaphors thus accounting for a communicatively relevant array of 












































4. REVISITING METAPHORICAL AMALGAMS 
 
Metaphoric amalgams, as previously explained, arise from the interaction 
between two or more metaphors in which there may or may not be integration of 
conceptual structure. Following previous classifications, this paper categorizes 
metaphoric amalgams into single-source metaphoric amalgams, double-source 
metaphoric amalgams (Ruiz de Mendoza and Galera 2014), to which it is possible 
to add a third new category, termed binary metaphoric amalgams, to be treated in 
section 4.3. The analyses of our examples will make extensive use of the Divided 
Self metaphor, as also mentioned above. 
  
4.1. Single-source metaphoric amalgams 
 
As briefly introduced in 3.1.1, in a single-source metaphoric amalgam, one 
metaphor becomes part of the source-target structure of another metaphor (Ruiz de 
Mendoza & Galera 2011: 18). In its most basic form, this combination incorporates 
structure of one metaphor onto another with which it shares some relevant elements. 
This is the situation examined in 3.1.1.  
An interesting instance of a single-source metaphoric amalgam is provided by the 
sentence My boss is a pig (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza 2017). A superficial analysis of this 
example might account for it in terms of one single metaphor, i.e. PEOPLE ARE 
ANIMALS (cf. Lakoff & Turner 1989: 196; Kövecses 2010: 153). It is also possible to 
analyze it, as Kövecses (2011) does for similar metaphors, in terms of a combination 
of metaphor and metonymy whereby the whole category designated by the source 
(‘pig’) stands for one of its idiosyncratic properties (‘filth’). However, the analytical 
situation is still more complex since the meaning implications of this expression go 
beyond the domain of physical dirtiness into the domain of ethics. In normal 
circumstances, we would use My boss is a pig to express the lack of morality of a 
person. There is a logic behind this use, since pigs are filthy (they are typically 
covered with mud containing their own excrement), and in English filthiness is 
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commonly associated with immorality (cf. dirty business, dirty hands, dirty little 
secrets) while cleanliness is suggestive of morality and a good reputation (e.g. His 
hands are clean ‘He is innocent’, He came out clean in the investigation 
‘unincriminated’) (see Lakoff 2003: 76). Most people will find a pig’s smell revolting. 
Experientially, a pig’s stench is the effect of its habits (the cause). Also, many people 
find immoral behavior (cause) likewise revolting (effect). In this case, “pig” is used 
metonymically (CAUSE FOR EFFECT). This association of similar effects gives rise 
to an association of their different underlying causes, which is exploited by the 
metaphor. Thus, by saying My boss is a pig, we not only treat a person as if s/he 
were an animal (basically, through an exploitation of the metaphor PEOPLE ARE 
ANIMALS, likely in combination with the metonymy CATEGORY FOR PROPERTY), 
but we also focus our attention on the typical characteristic of pigs as particularly 
dirty and revolting animals, like immoral people, thereby invoking IMMORALITY IS 
FILTH. Figure 1 represents the interaction between the two metaphors. 
 
SOURCE      TARGET 




Figure 1. My boss is a pig 
 
Another case of a single-source amalgam is illustrated by the sentence I got an 
idea. In this frequently employed expression, ideas are seen as something that you 
can possess. Possession gives the owner access to the object, which can thus be 
perceptually explored. Perceptual exploration maps metaphorically onto intellectual 
understanding. That is, if one gets the idea, you own it, and as a result you 
understand the problem and you can work on a solution. Here there is also an 






EXPLORING AN OBJECT, and IDEAS ARE OBJECTS (THAT YOU CAN 
POSSESS). The latter is mapped onto the source-target structure of 
UNDERSTANDING IS OBTAINING A POSSESSION, thus resulting in a single-
source metaphoric amalgam. This is shown in Figure 2: 
 




Figure 2. I got an idea. 
 
A third example of single-source amalgams is seen in the sentence She was 
shattered by his death. The grief the subject feels for the loss of a loved one is 
interpreted figuratively as making her emotional self break into pieces in the same 
way as a piece of brittle glass. This situation is initially captured by the metaphor 
EMOTIONAL SELF IS A BRITTLE OBJECT. However, this label does not reflect 
some of the meaning implications of this sentence. Because of her grief, the subject 
is in a state of emotional instability that impedes her from normal functioning in her 
activities. Thus, being in a state of shock is represented in the sentence as being 
shattered. We are relating structural integrity with the cohesion of the emotional self 
of a person, which can be expressed with the metaphor COHERENT IS WHOLE. 
This is integrated into the structure of the main metaphor, as reflected in Figure 3. 
 




Figure 3. She was shattered by his death. 
UNDERSTANDING PERCEPTUALLY EXPLORING 
AN OBJECT 
IDEAS OBJECTS (THAT YOU CAN 
POSSESS) 
EMOTIONAL SELF 




An additional example of single-source amalgams can be found in the resultative 
sentence with a fake-reflexive object He pulled himself free (Simpson 1983; Peña 
2016), in the sense of ‘he released himself from a situation of restraint (physical, 
psychological, spiritual, etc.)’. The verb pull is defined by the Merriam-Webster 
dictionary as “to exert force upon so as to cause or tend to cause motion toward the 
force”. The realization above suggests detachment as a consequence of the 
application of such a force (whether physical or not). We can pull a door, a chair, or 
any item towards us with the use of force. This sense of pull which involves physical 
detachment underlies intransitive uses like He pulled free (cf. Goldberg & Jackendoff 
2004: 559), which involve physical detachment. To this meaning, pulled himself free 
adds the implication that the protagonist found difficulties (e.g. by being entangled) 
in becoming free. Such an implication arises from the use of the DIVIDED SELF 
metaphor. Boas (2003: 241-243) has also noted that in resultative realizations 
involving changes of location, as is the case of Blair walked himself back to bed, the 
agent is depicted as overcoming some kind of obstacle against which he has to use 
his own will in order to move from point A to point B. This pragmatic effect, however, 
is absent if the fake reflexive is omitted (cf. Blair walked to bed). Boas thus concludes 
that it is pragmatic factors, instead of semantic or syntactic ones, that motivate the 
use of the reflexive in the example above (see also Peña 2016: 517-518).   
As mentioned in section 3.2, the DIVIDED SELF metaphor splits the person into 
the Subject, which is the rational and controlling part, and the Self, the irrational and 
emotional part. The disruption of the co-location between both entities often causes 
a situation of abnormality that the Subject aims to fix (NORMAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
AND CONTROL OF SELF BY SUBJECT IS THE CO-LOCATION OF SUBJECT 
AND SELF). In our example, the Self is “himself”, which is in a state of restraint. The 
Subject (he) is aware of the state of freedom, or normality, and he tries to pull the 
Self towards himself, achieving co-location, and also the preferred state of freedom. 
Additionally, by pulling the Self from that situation, another metaphor comes into 
play: STATES ARE LOCATIONS, or more specifically, A (CAUSED) CHANGE OF 
STATE IS A (CAUSED) CHANGE OF LOCATION (cf. Lakoff 1993). Freedom is 
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understood as a location that we pull ourselves to.3 As shown in Figure 4, the source-
target structure of NORMAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND CONTROL OF SELF BY 
SUBJECT IS THE CO-LOCATION OF SUBJECT AND SELF becomes part of the 
main metaphor, i.e. A (CAUSED) CHANGE OF STATE IS A (CAUSED) CHANGE 
OF LOCATION. 
 








Figure 4. He pulled himself free  
 
This analysis only applies to the most literal interpretation of the sentence. 
However, we can also interpret the sentence as liberating oneself from emotional, 
intellectual and other non-physical ties. In this other case, there is an additional 
metaphor that maps physical restraint onto emotional restraint or, in this case, the 
liberation from it. In consequence, EMOTIONAL/INTELLECTUAL LIBERATION IS 
PHYSICAL LIBERATION is to be added to the analysis. This metaphor is integrated 
into the target domain of A (CAUSED) CHANGE OF STATE IS A (CAUSED) 
CHANGE OF LOCATION, since it expands its range from the physical to the 
psychological “ties”. This process in which concepts have to be recruited from 
																																								 																				
3 Note that in this specific case the metaphor A CAUSED CHANGE OF STATE IS A CAUSED CHANGE OF 
LOCATION is not triggered by a resultative phrase based on a Prepositional Phrase, as is the case of break into 
freedom, but directly on the nature of pull as a motion verb. The change of state involved in pull oneself free is 
thus to be interpreted in terms of physical motion: ‘pull oneself into a location in space where one is free’.     
-A caused change of location 
-Causer of change 
-Object of change 
-Force 
-Counterforce 
-A caused change of state 
-Causer of change 
-Object of change 
-Skills to untie 
-Ties 
Co-location of subject and 
self 
Normal consciousness and 
control of self by subject 
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additional conceptual domains is called integration by combination (cf. Peña 2008; 
Ruiz de Mendoza 2011: 109).  
We can find another example of this combination pattern in the sentence There is 
electricity between us4 and its variant There is a real spark between us. The meaning 
of these two sentences involves an intangible connection between the speaker and 
the hearer, which results in physical tension, resembling an electrical current 
between their bodies. We relate the social or sexual excitement with electrical 
energy, which we can correlate with DESIRES ARE FORCES (Lakoff 1996). 
However, this initial analysis still falls short of supplying a full understanding of all 
the meaning implications of these expressions. In order to convey their complete 
connotations, we need to relate human desire and excitement with energy, in this 
specific case, electricity. Thus, EXCITEMENT IS ELECTRICITY is integrated with 
DESIRES ARE FORCES. This gives a better account of the expression, but still 
lacks a final layer: the spark -or electrical energy between both entities- needs to be 
accounted for. This is evidenced by the use of between, which invokes a link schema 
between the speaker and the addressee, in which there is a correlation between 
human relationships and physical links. The link image schema is also found in 
English in other expressions such as They have chemistry and We are bonded, or 
We have bonds between us. We account for this phenomenon through the metaphor 
HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS ARE PHYSICAL LINKS. The source and target 
metaphorical domains of DESIRES ARE FORCES are incorporated into the 
corresponding domains of the previous metaphor, thus resulting in a single-source 








4 Carr D 2009 The Night of the Gun: A reporter investigates the darkest story of his life. His own Simon & 
Schuster: New York. 
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Figure 5. There is electricity between us. 
 
Take now the case of the single-source metaphoric amalgam in the sentence Your 
reputation precedes you5. Think of this sentence in the context of a film in which the 
first conversation between the hero and the villain contains an exchange of unveiled 
quips between the two rivals. The common interpretation of this sentence can be 
expanded to ‘I get to know about your reputation before I get to know you’. The 
interest of this example lies in its internal complexity. First, to understand the concept 
of reputation we have to turn back to the DIVIDED SELF metaphor. The Merriam-
Webster dictionary defines reputation as ‘overall quality or character as seen or 
judged by people in general; recognition by other people of some characteristic or 
ability’. This characteristic is an aspect of the Self, i.e. oneself as perceived by others 
(it could be one’s honesty, strength, commitment to a cause, or any characteristic 
that becomes relevant, whether good or bad). Like other aspects of the Self, it is one 
over which the Subject has no control, since it depends on other people’s value 
judgments; that is, for all intents and purposes, it is what people know about 
someone at least until they meet with him. In other words, in the expression above, 
a person’s reputation figuratively reaches others before they get to personally know 
that person, which evokes a figurative motion scenario involving a path and a 
destination. In this scenario, the reputation completes its path before the person 
does. This happens in compliance with the metaphor GETTING TO KNOW A 
PERSON IS TRACKING THE MOTION OF THE PERSON’S SELF TO ITS 
DESTINATION, which parameterizes PROCESS IS MOTION while combining it with 
																																								 																				
5 Ramirez M & Schmidt L (Writer) & Surjik S (Director) 2016 ‘Seven minutes in heaven’ [Television series 






the DIVIDED SELF metaphor. Let us discuss how this is carried out in some more 
detail. The process of knowing a person through his reputation is seen in terms of 
motion. In this process, there is another element, the addressee (you), which 
figuratively comes after his ‘reputation’ along the same path. Additionally, ‘reputation’ 
stands in a metonymic relationship with the Self, in application of a PART-FOR-
WHOLE configuration; that is, while a person’s reputation designates an aspect of 
such a person’s Self, it also becomes everything others will find relevant about that 
person. This enables people to take this aspect of the person as if it were the whole 
Self. You is the Subject, which, at the end of the process, may eventually share or 
not its figurative location with the Self once again, depending on whether the Subject 
regains control of the Self or not (note that regaining control will generally be 
desirable when the reputation is assessed negatively by others). In addition to our 
previous analysis, it is necessary to mention that the integration between PROCESS 
IS MOTION and the DIVIDED SELF (specifically the metaphor LACK OF CONTROL 
OF SELF IS LACK OF CO-LOCATION OF SUBJECT AND SELF) is the same as 
the one in the previous example, that is, it is a case of integration by combination: 
the MOTION schema is enriched by means of the CO-LOCATION scenario of the 
DIVIDED SELF.  
Once we have established the motion process between the parts of the person, 
the metaphor KNOWLEDGE IS PERCEPTION is mapped onto the previous 
amalgam. This makes it possible for us to capture the full range of context-
independent meaning implications of the sentence. The way we get to know, 
understand, and gain knowledge about the reputation of the person in question is by 
means of the perceptual examination of an image-schematic scenario. In the case 
under scrutiny, the metaphor KNOWLEDGE IS PERCEPTION is built into 















Figure 6. Your reputation precedes you. 
 
Another complex example of amalgam involving the DIVIDED SELF metaphor is 
found in the expression: Your ego is writing checks your body can’t cash, meaning 
that the addressee is making promises that he cannot fulfill. This metaphor differs 
from Your reputation precedes you in its different exploitation of the idea of ‘lack of 
control’, which here is related not to the locational dissociation between the Subject 
and Self, but the lack of coordinated action. This lack of coordinated action is caused 
by the inability of the body (which here stands for the none-motional aspects of the 
person) to cash the checks written by the ego (the emotional self). Ultimately, what 
we have is a metaphor in which writing and cashing checks is interpreted as making 
and fulfilling promises. People only write checks that they know they can pay in the 
same way that one can only make promises that one knows one can act upon. The 
main metaphor of this sentence can thus be labelled (WRITING) A CHECK IS 
(MAKING) A PROMISE. Additionally, there is a dissociation of the addressee akin 
to what we have seen in previous examples, however with a few differences. The 
expression “your ego” represents the addressee’s (emotional) SELF, in a PART FOR 
WHOLE metonymic relationship, whose reckless decisions cannot be carried out by 
“the body”, which, on the basis of another PART FOR WHOLE metonymy, stands 
for the person who uses his or her body for physical action. There is no mismatch in 
PERCEPTION  KNOWLEDGE 
          (perceiving the object)                               (understanding the idea) 
MOTION							 	 	 										PROCESS	
DIVIDED SELF (SUBJECT + SELF) 
LACK OF CONTROL OF SUBJECT OVER 
SELF IS LACK OF CO-LOCATION OF 
SUBJECT AND SELF 
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the location of both figurative entities in this case, thus differing from previous 
examples. Rather, what we have in this case is a lack of control of the subject over 
the self, which causes a conflict because of the inability of the subject to live up to 
the promises made by “the ego” (the emotional self). There is a certain lack of 
coordinated action between the two entities as a result. We can capture this situation 
with the metaphor LACK OF COORDINATED ACTION BETWEEN SUBJECT AND 
SELF IS LACK OF CONTROL OF SUBJECT OVER SELF, into which is built the 
source-target structure of the metaphor (WRITING) A CHECK IS (MAKING) A 
PROMISE.  
 
















WRITING CHECKS							 	 								MAKING	PROMISES 
-Cashing checks           -Fulfilling promises              
with no funds                                              that can’t be fulfilled 
DIVIDED SELF (SUBJECT + SELF) 
LACK OF COORDINATED ACTION BETWEEN SUBJECT/SELF  
LACK OF CONTROL OF 
SUBJECT (THE CASHER OF 
CHECKS OVER SELF (THE 
WRITER OF CHECKS) 




4.2. Double-source metaphoric amalgams 
 
Double-source metaphoric amalgams involve two participating metaphors 
working at the same level. These metaphors are simultaneously mapped onto the 
same target domain. The previous literature has based the analysis of this amalgam 
on the example He beat silence into me briefly examined in 3.1.1 above (see Ruiz 
de Mendoza & Galera 2014: 102 for a similar example).  
Let us now discuss some examples from our corpus. One is the expression to 
have one’s head in the clouds, as in She has her head in the clouds, she’s 
unrealistic.6 This idiomatic expression traditionally means ‘to be unaware of events 
happening around oneself because of daydreaming, or being engulfed in one’s own 
thoughts’. The statement that someone has his or her head in the clouds depicts a 
figurative detachment of the head from the body, resulting in a state of lack of 
awareness and control of ideas. Bearing this in mind, it is not difficult to find the 
relation of this depiction to the DIVIDED SELF metaphor. In Lakoff’s Theory of the 
Multiple Selves, one of the Consciousness and Control models of the DIVIDED SELF 
is the vertical model, in which the Self is conceptualized as being down on earth with 
the body. This state is the basis of normality to strive for, described by Lakoff (1993: 
13) in terms of the metaphor BEING IN A NORMAL STATE IS BEING DOWN 
THERE. This metaphor is generalized into LACK OF NORMAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
AND LACK OF CONTROL OF SELF BY SUBJECT IS THE SEPARATION OF 
SUBJECT AND SELF. As shown in Figure 7, the source domain of this metaphor is 
mapped onto the same target domain of the other metaphor present in this idiom, 
LACK OF NORMAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND LACK OF CONTROL OF SELF BY 






6 White, B.A. (2003). The Beecher Sisters. Yale University Press: Yale. p. 183 
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Figure 8. To have one’s head in the clouds. 
 
A more complex example of a double-source metaphoric amalgam is the 
expression pick someone’s brain (e.g. Mind if I pick your brain for a minute?)7, which 
generally refers to the action of exploring someone’s ideas through questioning. The 
use of brain in this sentence follows the folk model of brain-mind relationships in 
which the brain is treated as a container of ideas, which can take the form of objects 
(e.g. He had “a thousand things” in his heart, “but absolutely nothing” in his brain)8 
or substances (e.g. You get all that stuff out of your brain and then you can 
concentrate on work and leisure activities more fully).9 It may be argued that the 
brain-mind folk model is in fact the result of a combination of two metaphors into a 
single-source amalgam: THE BRAIN IS A CONTAINER and IDEAS ARE 
OBJECTS/SUBSTANCES. However, this is not so. For two metaphors to be 
amalgamated, each of them needs to be a self-standing mapping.10 The brain-
container mapping is not independent of the ideas-contents correspondence where 





7 Soltis, A. (2003). Los Voraces 2019: A Chess Novel. McFarland. p. 159. 
8 Walsh, R.A. (2003). Ugo Foscolo’s Tragic Vision in Italy and England. University of Toronto Press. p. 71  
9 http://www.wbur.org/radioboston/2014/08/28/levitin-organized-neuroscience (accessed on December 22, 
2016). 
10 This is an important point that has not been made explicit by Ruiz de Mendoza and his collaborators, although 











SOURCE                      TARGET 
 
 
Figure 9. A BRAIN IS A CONTAINER. 
 
The situation is different in the case of pick someone’s brain. Here, pick suggests 
using a pointed instrument to break up, separate, and remove matter from a place 
(cf. He picked his teeth). Since ideas can be figuratively “extracted” from brains (e.g. 
Where did you get that idea from?), “picking” can be seen, also figuratively, as one 
possible extraction method. The complex metaphor that we have is, then, 
QUESTIONING FOR INFORMATION IS EXTRACTING MATTER FROM A 
CONTAINER combined with THE BRAIN IS A CONTAINER. In this amalgam, the 
ideas produced by the brain or the information stored in it is seen as the contents in 
a container. In a complementary way, obtaining such ideas or information is seen in 
terms of physical extraction of materials from a place. The result of this amalgam is 
that we think of questioning for information as getting materials out of a container. 
The integration process involved in this double-source metaphoric amalgam is 
schematized in Figure 10.  
 





Figure 10. Mind if I pick your brain for a minute? 
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We saw above that Lakoff (1996) touches lightly on the importance of the 
DIVIDED SELF metaphor for grammar. However, there has been little work on this 
idea, perhaps because there is a strong tendency to think of reflexive pronouns as 
mere grammatical devices. The work on fake resultatives by Boas (2003) and Peña 
(2016) mentioned above is a step forward in this respect. To this work, we may add 
some observations on the virtual reflexive construction, which is exemplified by Levin 
(1993: 84) by means of sentences like This meat cuts itself, This silver polishes itself, 
and This window just opens itself. The meaning of this construction is very similar to 
that of the inchoative and middle constructions, but the range of verbs that combine 
with it is more restricted. It may be useful to compare The window opened 
(inchoative) and These windows open nicely (middle) with This window just opens 
itself and The window opened itself (virtual reflexive). The inchoative and middle 
constructions work by making the object of an action appear as the grammatical 
subject, endowing them with an “agent-like” value (Heyvaert 2003: 132; Radden & 
Dirven 2007: 290; Ruiz de Mendoza 2008: 142).  
In a sense, the inchoative and middle constructions could be regarded as 
“pretense” constructions, since they give the false appearance that the semantic 
object is actually an agent (when the action has an affected object, as in The glass 
broke) or an actor (or doer of the action with a non-affected object, as in This book 
reads easily). Of course, both speaker and hearer know that there is a real agent. 
These constructions only play down the agent’s role and draw the hearer’s attention 
to the action itself, which is presented as if it were a process. The same holds for the 
virtual reflexive construction, which presents the object as the agent of an action that 
affects the object. There are other pretense constructions, like the instrument-subject 
construction (This oven bakes great cakes), the cause-subject construction (The 
letter established his innocence; cf. Peña 2015: 1247-1302), and the locative-subject 
construction (The garden swarmed with bees; cf. Levin & Rappaport Hovav 2005: 
186-187) where other elements of the action scenario other than the object are 
presented as if they were the doers of the action. However, we will focus our attention 
here on the relationship between the virtual reflexive and the inchoative and middle 
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pair because they all share a common pretense, i.e. the idea that the semantic object 
does the action.  
The inchoative and middle constructions have been treated by Ruiz de Mendoza 
and Peña (2008) as being motivated by metonymy: PROCESS FOR ACTION (The 
door opened, whose target is ‘Someone opened the door’) underlies inchoative 
constructions, while the double metonymic shift PROCESS FOR ACTION FOR 
RESULT holds for middle constructions; the latter can highlight either the process 
(The window opened easily, i.e. ‘It was easy (for us) to open the window’) or the 
result (The window opened well, i.e. ‘Someone opened the window well’). The virtual 
reflexive construction is very close in meaning to the inchoative and middle 
constructions. Consider This book reads itself, which is discussed in Postal (2010: 
171) from a formal perspective under the more general label of reflexive passive. 
According to Postal, the meaning of this construction corresponds to the meaning of 
a middle construction with an explicit evaluative component assessing the process: 
This book reads easily. Postal further argues that middle constructions are but 
reflexive passives (which correspond to Levin’s virtual reflexives) with invisible 
reflexives. This claim emphasizes the similarity in meaning between the two 
constructions, but it falls short of explaining why not all middle constructions can be 
converted into fake reflexive constructions and vice versa. In my view, a better 
explanation should focus on the non-formal aspects of the two construction types. 
The middle construction is used to assess either the processual or resultative 
aspects of an action scenario while de-profiling the agent. The virtual reflexive 
construction is also evaluative too, but it does not focus on one or another aspect of 
the action but on the whole action itself. In addition, the virtual reflexive construction 
makes more emphasis than the middle construction on the evaluative ingredient, 
which is always positive (cf. *This book doesn't read itself, but This book doesn't read 
easily). This difference in meaning is captured by means of a metaphoric complex 
involving the personification of the object of the action and the DIVIDED SELF 
metaphor. The licensing factor for this metaphoric complex to be activated is the 
high-level metonymy EFFECT FOR CAUSE. Let us briefly discuss how this 
happens. 
	 30	
The basic meaning of This book reads itself is that reading the book is a 
pleasurable, effortless activity. These features of the book-reading event are the 
effect element of such an event and they stand for whatever it is that causes them. 
The cause is internal to the book itself, i.e. there is something in its contents that 
makes them easy and enjoyable. But the target meaning of the expression goes 
beyond this meaning implication. The idea to be conveyed is a hyperbolic one: the 
book is easy and likeable to an extreme. The conceptual strategy to achieve this 
intended meaning impact is to think of the book-reading event as if it required no 
human involvement. This takes place through an amalgam of (metaphorical) 
personification and the DIVIDED SELF metaphor. Through the personification, the 
internal cause is treated as if it were an external cause with an external actor. In this 
way, the object of reading, i.e. the book, is endowed with agentive qualities. At the 
same time, through the DIVIDED SELF metaphor the new agent is seen as acting 
on itself. Since the true actor (a human being) has been de-profiled, the action is 
seen as being carried out without external intervention, as if it happened by itself; by 
implication, an action that needs no external intervention is extremely easy in 
evaluative terms. It is in this way that the evaluative component is hyperbolically 
enhanced well beyond what is the case in the middle construction in This book reads 
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Figure 11. This book reads itself. 
ACTION FRAME (book reading event) 




a) Book seen as an object in an 
effortless book-reading event that 
produces pleasure. 






4.3. Binary amalgams 
 
There are some cases of interaction in our corpus in which neither of the two 
metaphors has priority over the other and both operate within the boundaries of the 
same schema. This phenomenon can be labelled binary amalgam. A binary 
amalgam is different from a single-source metaphoric amalgam, since in the former, 
unlike what is the case in the latter, there is no merging of one of the metaphors into 
the source-target structure of the other. Binary amalgams also differ from double-
source metaphoric amalgams because the metaphors involved in the amalgam, 
even though neither is subsidiary to the other, do not map onto the same target 
domain. An example of a binary amalgam is provided by the sentence The regulation 
clashed with his intentions. The intentions of the subject in this sentence are seen 
as if they were a moving object propelled by a motion-causing force, whereas the 
regulation is an obstacle to such motion that blocks the object from reaching its goal. 
On a very basic level of analysis we would incorporate the metaphor ACTION IS 
SELF-PROPELLED MOTION, and more particularly one of its ramifications, i.e. 
OBSTACLES TO ACTION ARE OBSTACLES TO MOTION. The presence of the 
obstacle impeding motion would require the incorporation of the BLOCKAGE 
schema, which makes reference to the experience of obstacles which block or resist 
some force (Peña, 2008). In this particular example, however, this head-on clash is 
a special kind of obstacle as both kinetic forces act in opposite directions. Following 
the discussion in Kövecses (1990: 153-154), on a subsequent level of analysis, what 
we have here is a will-counter-will relationship, which is presented in terms of a force-
dynamic metaphor. Talmy (1988) introduced the notion of the force schema into 
semantic description. In his account, an AGONIST (or FORCE) is opposed by an 
ANTAGONIST (or COUNTERFORCE). The regulation, which existed before the 
subject’s intentions, is the FORCE. It moves along its designated path in a direction 
towards its destination (GOALS ARE DESTINATIONS). Opposed to this FORCE, 
there is an ANTAGONIST (COUNTERFORCE), in this case the person’s will, which 
acts against the FORCE and blocks it from reaching its destination. As can be seen 
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from this description, the metaphor LAWS AND REGULATIONS ARE FORCES 
complements the metaphor A PERSON’S WILL IS A COUNTERFORCE in such a 
way that neither of them has prominence over the other, which precludes this 
interactional schema from fitting into any of the previous categories for amalgams 











Figure 12. Binary amalgam system. 
 
An additional example of binary system is found in the sentence She could bend 
his will, in which the subject is seen as being able to mold a person’s will as if it were 
a malleable object. A solid object has an internal force, a resistance, which keeps its 
shape and gives the object its properties. However, in this example the subject 
(“she”) is able to “bend” it figuratively. What this expression does is ascribe physical 
properties to a psychological event. In this event, the subject has a psychological 
“impact” on another person in such a way that such a person will change his will. 
Note that “bending” someone’s will is the equivalent of (i.e. stands for) forcing a 
person to change, which is in essence a metonymy. This situation involves once 
again a clash between a FORCE and a COUNTERFORCE. In this case, ‘his will’ is 
A PERSON´S 







the COUNTERFORCE to the FORCE that is being applied by the subject, with the 
metaphors A PERSON’S WILL IS A COUNTERFORCE and PSYCHOLOGICAL 
FORCES ARE PHYSICAL FORCES interacting at the same level. 
On a related note, let us discuss the example Reagan brought pressure to bear 
upon his cabinet. In this sentence, a clear confrontation between the political “forces” 
of the late President of the United States and his cabinet are highlighted. Once again, 
a force dynamics schema is used to represent this clash between psychological 
forces as an agonist and an antagonist, or a force and a counterforce. Reagan 
applies his political “force” upon his cabinet in order to achieve his particular goals, 
as if the will of his cabinet were a piece of metal that is being bent in order to fit into 
a contraption. Reagan’s final goal is to divert the course of the will of his cabinet so 
he can reach his initial goal as close as possible. Again, this example is a case of 
the metaphor PSYCHOLOGICAL FORCES ARE PHYSICAL FORCES in 
combination with A PERSON’S WILL IS A COUNTERFORCE. 
Another example of binary amalgam is provided by the sentence The sign warned 
us against skating on the pond (Levin 1993: 38). In this example, skating on the pond 
is presented as potentially dangerous, which is the reason for the warning sign. 
People who would like to skate on the dangerous pond are that way dissuaded from 
doing so. Strictly speaking, it is not the sign itself (i.e. the medium for the message) 
that issues any warning, but the people in charge of producing safety regulations for 
citizens (e.g. the local city council). This is a case of complex metonymic thinking, 
elsewhere referred to as a metonymic chain (Ruiz de Mendoza and Galera 2014): 
the medium used to publish a regulation stands for the regulation, which in turn 
stands for the issuer of the regulation. In the realization above, we understand that 
the speakers’ will of skating on the pond is countered by the sign that prohibits them 
from doing such action. In its default interpretation, this sign materializes a 
regulation, which reminds people that skating is forbidden and a violation of such 
warning will bring consequences. This regulation is a force that acts against the force 
represented by the person’s will, metaphorically speaking: in principle, nothing 
physically impedes the person from skating on that pond, but his will to do so is 
countered by the sign and the regulations it represents. Laws and regulations are 
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seen as psychological AGONISTS (FORCES) against an ANTAGONIST 
(COUNTERFORCE), which is a person’s will to perform an action. The sign, through 
a metonymic chain, stands for the regulation or law, and is given the properties of a 
person, in this case the authorities, since a sign is unable to actively warn us. Thus, 
the metonymic chain MEDIUM FOR REGULATION FOR AUTHORITY (a case of 
domain expansion plus domain reduction) interacts with the metaphors A 
PERSON’S WILL IS A COUNTERFORCE and REGULATIONS ARE FORCES.  
The reasons why this is a binary system, as opposed to either of the two previous 
categories, could be summarized as follows: (i) A PERSON’S WILL IS A 
COUNTERFORCE and REGULATIONS ARE FORCES are two metaphors that 
complement each other, none of them being more prominent than the other; thus, 
this combination cannot be a single-source metaphoric amalgam; (ii) the two 
metaphors do not map onto the same target domain, so this combination cannot be 
classified as a double-source amalgam either. 
An additional example of a binary amalgam is found in the sentence Your 
argument is leading away from the conclusion you want to reach (Lakoff et al 1991: 
125). In this sentence, the conclusion the subject assumes that the hearer wants to 
achieve is seen as a destination. The metaphor A LOGICAL ARGUMENT IS A 
FORCE (which “moves” ideas, i.e. causes them to develop according to some logic) 
works in combination with IDEAS ARE (MOVING) OBJECTS and 
(ARGUMENTATIVE) GOALS ARE DESTINATIONS. This metaphor is opposed by 
AN ALTERNATIVE LOGICAL ARGUMENT IS A COUNTERFORCE (which “moves” 
alternative ideas toward an alternative argumentative goal). This metaphor also 
teams up with the counterparts within the alternative logical system of IDEAS ARE 
OBJECTS and (ARGUMENTATIVE) GOALS ARE DESTINATIONS. In this way, we 
have a more complex picture than provided by our previous examples of binary 
amalgam. What we have here is a FORCE-COUNTERFORCE binary amalgam 
where each terms of the binary system is itself made up of further metaphorical 
complexes. Each complex takes the form of a double amalgam combining two 
single-source amalgams in the following way (where “<” symbolizes the 
incorporation of one metaphor into another): 
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(ARGUMENTATIVE) GOALS ARE DESTINATIONS < IDEAS ARE (MOVING) 
OBJECTS < A LOGICAL ARGUMENT IS A FORCE 
It should be noted that the metaphors (ARGUMENTATIVE) GOALS ARE 
DESTINATIONS and IDEAS ARE (MOVING) OBJECTS are self-standing in nature, 
that is, their existence is independent of the matrix metaphor A LOGICAL 
ARGUMENT IS A FORCE realizing the FORCE-COUNTERFORCE binary system. 
Thus, GOALS ARE DESTINATIONS can be part of other conceptual systems in the 
domain of goal-oriented activities such as professions, careers, love relationships, 
and making business (cf. We are not going anywhere, They hit a dead-end street, 
He getting to the top of the social ladder). In turn, IDEAS ARE OBJECTS can be 
found in expressions such as You need to polish your ideas up a bit more, That was 
hard-hitting truth, and He managed to get the idea across easily. In these 
expressions ideas are not seen in causal terms, unlike in the example of binary 
amalgam under analysis.  
The force-counterforce relationship is image-schematic in nature, since it involves 
caused motion along a path and obstacles or impediments to motion. It also involves 
tension between forces. Such tension may have different consequences. One force 
may override another, two forces may cancel out each other or one force may cause 
a path diversion. Our familiarity with tension between forces allows us to interpret 
non-physical “tension” in terms of the force-counterforce relationships and their 
consequences. This has been evident in our analysis of the skating notice example. 
A warning can be used as a social restriction carrying consequences (e.g. penalties) 
when challenged and disobeyed. Disobedience may also have other consequences 
in terms of physical injuries (think of the thin ice on the surface of a pond breaking 
as someone skates on it). A warning is a directive speech act and, as such, it clearly 
involves a potential speaker-hearer tension. Because of our daily experience with 
force-counterforce relationships it is not difficult for us to reason about speaker-
hearer tension, in whatever degree, in terms of force-counterforce tension. This 
affects all directive speech act categories, as suggested in Pérez and Ruiz de 
Mendoza (2002). For example, a command, which is highly impositive, can be 
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interpreted as a force that cannot be resisted. Requests are less impositive and can 
be resisted, i.e. there can be potential obstacles to their realization. Threats are as 
impositive as orders. Only the source of their impositive nature changes: orders are 
grounded in socially-sanctioned authority, while threats are based on potential 
hostile action that the speaker thinks the hearer will want to avoid. In terms of 
metaphor, threats can readily be seen as highly compelling attempts to get around 
a potential blockage to the course of a force. Advising and suggesting are also ways 
to get the hearer to change a course of action. But they are milder attempts. In terms 
of force-dynamics, the hearer’s desired course of action cannot be seen as a 
blockage but as a milder form of resistance that can be easily removed or, 
alternatively, circumvented. In this approach, we have the following general 
correspondences between the force image schema and the domain of directivity. 





Physical course of a force Social course of action 
The agonist exerts force on the antagonist 
to make it follow a given course 
Speaker directs hearer to do something 
Degree of force Degree of directivity 
Resultant force balance Resultant balance of social tension 
Physical obstacles Social and/or personal impediments or 
restraints 
 
Figure 13. Correspondences between the FORCE image schema and the domain of directivity. 
 
Binary amalgams can only occur with the FORCE-COUNTERFORCE schema 
because this schema is, as far as we know, the only image-schematic configuration 
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where two of its central elements are profiled simultaneously against the background 
provided by the rest of elements of the same configuration (MOTION, PATH, 
SOURCE, DESTINATION). This is not the case with other image-schematic pairs 
like IN/OUT, UP/DOWN, or PART/WHOLE, which also come in related pairs, simply 
because the elements of each pair are profiled separately. Thus, if an object is 
profiled as being inside a container, it cannot be profiled as being outside at the 
same time; in the same way, what is up is not down and a part is not a whole. But in 
the case of force-counterforce relations, both conceptual constructs are profiled 
simultaneously against the background of other relevant force-dynamic constructs 
(motion, path, destination, etc.) (cf. Talmy 1988, 2000). As a consequence, our data 
only reveal the existence of binary amalgams in relation to the force-counterforce 
balance within image-schematic thinking. This observation is consistent with the fact 
that the force-counterforce image-schematic balance is unique within the list of 
image schemas identified in the literature (cf. Johnson 1987; Peña 2008). Other 
image schemas do not work on the basis of equality but of subsidiarity. A case in 
point is the enrichment of the path schema through the container schema. It is not 
unusual to envisage the end-point of a path as if it were a container, for example, in 
figurative expressions like He went into a depression, His name faded into oblivion, 
He drank himself into a stupor. Other possibilities of combining image schemas on 



































The present article has discussed a selection of examples of metaphoric 
complexes used in contemporary English, all of them drawn from the literature in 
metaphor theory and the media. The analysis offered here, which refines more 
traditional analyses within Cognitive Linguistics, provides a glimpse into the complex 
metaphorical nature of the English language. Even on their everyday use, many 
metaphorical expressions help to convey a broad range of meaning implications that 
would be impossible to capture by postulating simple metaphors. 
These metaphorical operations do not usually operate alone. They can be either 
complemented by metonymies, or by other metaphors in what is called metaphoric 
complexes. We have focused our attention on one kind of these complexes: 
metaphoric amalgams. We have analyzed and categorized a collection of examples 
using Ruiz de Mendoza and Galera’s (2011: 17) system of classification of 
metaphoric amalgams: the most common amalgams, single-source metaphoric 
amalgams, in which the target-source domain structure of one metaphor is 
integrated into the target-source structure of another metaphor, and double-source 
metaphoric amalgams, in which two metaphorical sources map onto the same target 
domain. The analysis of many of the examples in our corpus has required taking into 
account the Theory of the Multiple Selves (Lakoff 1996), which captures a cultural 
model according to which humans are seen as consisting of two aspects: the Subject 
and the Self. The former is a person’s rational, controlled nature, and the latter his 
or her bodily and emotional aspects. The application of this cultural model has 
proven useful to address some analytical issues, which is suggestive of the 
theoretical value of this largely neglected theory.  
Finally, the extensive study of examples has also allowed us to postulate, 
although still programmatically, the existence of binary amalgams. Their actual 
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